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 1 
Summary 
Private actions for damages for competition law infringements has been a 
fiercely discussed topic in the European Union for more than a decade now. 
It was the famous Courage v. Crehan judgment from 2001, where the Court 
of Justice for the first time expressly stated that ‘any individual’ has the 
right to claim damages for a breach of EU competition law. Following the 
Green Paper in 2005, in 2008 the Commission issued the White Paper, 
which entailed a number of measures to be taken in order to overcome the 
current ineffectiveness of antitrust damages actions and to ensure that all 
victims of infringements of EU competition law can fully be compensated 
for their harm.  
 
In addition to addressing the procedural obstacles faced by litigants, the 
White Paper also included measures, which would form private 
enforcement’s relationship with public enforcement and indicate the 
former’s position in the overall enforcement system. It is this controversial 
role of private enforcement, which provided the inspiration for this thesis.  
 
The main function of private damages actions is to compensate the victims. 
For the Commission, however, the main function of competition 
enforcement is deterrence, where private damages actions contribute only 
little. This perception of the Commission greatly influenced the content of 
the proposals made in the White Paper, especially when it had to weigh the 
two enforcement methods against each other. 
 
There are four main areas dealt with in the White Paper, where in addition 
to facilitating damages claims, the Commission has also influenced the 
relationship between private and public enforcement. These are: the binding 
effect of NCA decisions, leniency, access to evidence and finally fines and 
damages. 
 
After having analysed these four areas, the conclusion is that the 
Commission’s proposals improve the potential claimants’ conditions for 
claiming damages, but at the same time, they also aim to ensure the 
dominance of public enforcement. This is especially clear in relation to 
leniency, where the Commission’s proposal to limit civil liability of 
successful leniency applicants goes directly against the principle of full 
compensation for all victims. Therefore, it seems that the Commission 
considers private damages actions mostly as adding to the deterrent effect, 
thus not prioritising their compensatory nature. Thus, even if the damages 
actions are facilitated by the measure, private enforcement still only has a 
secondary role next to public enforcement in the EU. 
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CompLRev.  Competition Law Review 
DG  Directorate General 
EC (Treaty)  Treaty establishing the European Community 
ECLR  European Competition Law Review 
ECN  European Competition Network 
ELRev.  European Law Review 
ERPL  European Review of Private Law 
GWB  Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 
NCA  National Competition Authority 
OJ  Official Journal 
TFEU  Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 3 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
To begin with, it is important to stress that the pairing of public and private 
enforcement of legal rules is not unique to the antitrust laws. This notion 
certainly predates those laws and expresses more fundamental ideas about 
the relationship between the state and private individuals and their 
respective roles in the implementation of the law.
1
  
 
It is generally accepted now that undertakings can be held liable for 
infringements of EU Competition law provisions, i.e. Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU
2
, both in public and private enforcement procedures. The case law 
and legislation on public enforcement on national (except for the ‘new’ 
Member States) and EU level has developed over several decades and 
therefore has reached a point of stability and maturity. The current system of 
public enforcement can be ascribed primarily to the EU legislator, laying 
down the procedural rules for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
in individual cases in Council Regulation 1/2003
3
 (hereinafter ‘Regulation 
1/2003) and the European Commission (hereinafter ‘the Commission’), with 
its wealthy decision-making practice.
4
 However, the world of antitrust 
enforcement in the EU is far from perfect. Although the EU commits 
comparatively generous resources to combat antitrust violations and 
additionally, it cooperates with the competition authorities of Member 
States, comprehensive control of anti-competitive or abusive practices 
through administrative action alone remains illusory.
5
 
 
Under the national laws of several Member States the possibility and 
availability of actions for damages
6
 has existed for a long time.
7
 Therefore, 
it should not be surprising that the Commission declared almost 30 years 
ago that it considers damages litigation desirable.
8
 However, regardless of 
                                               
1 A.P. Komninos, ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? 
Overlap?’ 3(1) CompLRev. (2006), p. 10. 
2 Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/49, 09.05.2008. 
3 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1/1-25, 04.01.2003. 
4 M.J. Frese, ‘Fines and Damages under EU Competition Law: Implications of the 
Accumulation of Liability’, 34(3) World Competition (2011), p. 398. 
5 T. Eilmansberger, ‘The Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules: reflections on the utility and feasibility of stimulating private enforcement through 
legislative action’, 44(2) CMLRev. (2007), p. 432. 
6 Private enforcement, action for damages, private damages claims are used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. 
7 See, for example, in the UK: Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] 
AC 130; in Germany: since 1955, special provisions in the Act against Restraints of 
Competition have enabled damages to be sought for harm resulting from anti-competitive 
conduct. Available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/national_reports/germany_en.pdf 
8 XIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1983 (1984), pp. 135-136. Available at 
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this statement, private enforcement came into the centre of attention of the 
European Commission a mere ten years ago and hence is not yet fully 
functional, to say the least. The so-called Ashurst Study famously referred 
to a state of ‘astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment’.9 By 
comparison, there is no doubt that private enforcement in Europe is certainly 
far less well developed than in the US. This is because the whole 
institutional system of antitrust enforcement in Europe has been 
fundamentally different, owing to the overwhelmingly central role of public 
enforcement.
10
 It was clear that this situation was not going to change on its 
own and that something needed to be done to advance private enforcement. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter 
‘the Court’) in Courage v. Crehan11 was the first time at Union level, in 
which the Court explicitly confirmed that the right to damages for breach of 
competition law derives directly from Union law. Therefore, it can be said 
that credit for the system of private enforcement may be claimed by the 
Court, who was the one giving the Commission the necessary impulse to 
start working on strengthening private enforcement.
 
So, apart from 
Regulation 1/2003, which made Articles 101 and 102 TFEU directly 
applicable in full and thereby facilitated the prohibition worded in those 
provisions, most developments in the field of private enforcement 
materialized progressively in the course of over fifty years of case law.
12
 
 
Although the statement made by the Court was straightforward and the 
message clear, some authors were still not convinced in the beginning of the 
last decade. They were questioning the importance of developing a stronger 
private enforcement system or even the necessity of having such a system at 
all, by stating that public enforcement fulfils the need of enforcement and 
deterrence.
13
 However, this view was struck down harshly and quickly by 
other authors arguing in favour of private enforcement of competition law.
14
   
 
The need to strengthen private enforcement has been a highly discussed 
topic for at least ten years now. The stronger the voices became supporting a 
model of competition law enforcement, which would also include a 
functioning private enforcement system, the more discussions were started 
                                                                                                                       
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/index.html 
9 Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition 
rules, produced by Ashurst for DG Competition, 31 August 2004. Executive Summary, 
p. 1. 
10 A.P. Komninos, ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? 
Overlap?’ 3(1) CompLRev. (2006), p. 6. 
11 Case C-453/99 Courage v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, in particular paras. 26-28, 32-33. 
12 M.J. Frese, ‘Fines and Damages under EU Competition Law: Implications of the 
Accumulation of Liability’, 34(3) World Competition (2011), p. 398. 
13 Most notably, W.P.J. Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in 
Europe?’ 26(3) World Competition (2003). 
14 See, for example, C.A. Jones, ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy 
Analysis and Reality Check’, 27(1) World Competition (2004), p. 13: ‘(t)his view is 
demonstrably in error from conceptual and practical standpoints and relies on purely non-
legal theoretical grounds and authorities which have no substantial application in the 
European Union’. 
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on how this should be done. So the Commission set out on the mission to 
identify the existing obstacles hindering private enforcement actions and as 
a result issued the ‘Green Paper on Damage Actions for Breach of EC 
Antitrust Rules’ (hereinafter ‘Green Paper’).15  
 
After the Green Paper, the discussions became even more heated and it was 
clear that the Commission did not have an easy task in getting all the 
stakeholders and more importantly all the Member States to agree on how 
exactly private enforcement should be strengthened on Union level. Some 
questioned whether action at Union level was even necessary in the first 
place. After all, the harmonisation measures would have struck very deep 
into an area, where the Member States so far have enjoyed sole competence.  
 
However, even before a measure can take form, the Commission needs to 
understand what it tries to achieve with the strengthening of private 
enforcement and what the latter’s aim is in the overall enforcement system. 
Since in this system, private enforcement needs to interact with public 
enforcement, which already has an established position. The question of 
interplay between private and public enforcement has raised into the focus 
of attention only in the last years, as the likelihood of a positive 
harmonisation of private enforcement is growing. To see where these 
discussions in the doctrine have led and where the development in the 
Union legislation has come to during this time justifies a closer look into 
this matter and hence the writing of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The aim of this thesis, more specifically, is to find out what position private 
enforcement will have in relation to public enforcement and in the overall 
enforcement system after the harmonisation of private damages actions. At 
the moment, the general perception is that the Commission is striving for a 
dual enforcement system, including both public and private enforcement. To 
understand what role private damages actions have to play in this system, 
first, their function needs to be determined. After that it becomes possible to 
see how the relationship between the two ‘limbs’ of enforcement looks like.  
 
This allows to identify the areas in which the two parts of the enforcement 
system are working in a complementary manner and areas where they work 
in a counter-active manner. These must then be assessed in the light of the 
proposals made by the Commission in the ‘White Paper on damages actions 
for breach of EC antitrust rules’16 (hereinafter ‘White Paper’). The outcome 
of this assessment should demonstrate how the Commission has handled the 
extremely difficult task of finding the delicate balance between the two 
enforcement methods in a situation where it strives for a stronger private 
                                               
15 COM(2005) 672, 19.12.2005. 
16 COM(2008) 165, 02.04.2008. 
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enforcement, while trying to maintain the current dominance of the public 
enforcer.  
 
1.3 Delimitation 
Damages actions are not the only possibility for private parties to enforce 
their rights under competition law. Private parties harmed or likely to be 
harmed by antitrust infringements can also bring actions for injunctive relief 
in national courts, and the antitrust prohibitions can also be invoked 
defensively in private contractual or intellectual property litigation.
17
 In 
practice, it appears that Article 101(2) TFEU
18
 is regularly invoked in 
contractual disputes as a defence against actions for breach of contract.
19
 
However, this latter form of private enforcement is not dealt with by this 
thesis, as the White Paper concentrates on facilitating damages actions.
20
 
Furthermore, injunctive relief is not a problematic matter either when it 
comes to the interplay between public and private enforcement. 
 
An additional delimitation comes from the fact that this thesis focuses only 
on the overall impact of harmonisation of private damages actions on the 
enforcement system. Therefore, the procedural issues (like passing-on 
defence, collective redress, limitation periods, etc.) addressed in the White 
Paper will not be touched upon, as they do not have such a significant 
influence the interaction between the two enforcement methods. 
 
1.4 Method and Material 
This thesis uses the traditional (dogmatic) method to interpret the existing 
law and to systematize the relevant case law and doctrine, in order to then 
see how the Commission’s harmonisation plans fit into the existing (mainly 
administrative) enforcement system.   
 
At the moment there is no hard-law existing on the Union level regarding 
private enforcement, therefore this thesis will analyse the White Paper 
issued by the Commission in 2008, as the unofficial ‘Draft Proposal for a 
Directive on Rules Governing Damages Actions for Infringements of 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’ is not publicly available. Case law of the 
Court is not in a better state, as to present date, there have only been a few 
cases involving the private enforcement questions.  
 
                                               
17 W.P.J. Wils, ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private 
Actions for Damages’, 32(1) World Competition (2009), p. 4. 
18 Art 101(2) TFEU: ‘Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall 
be automatically void.’ 
19 W.P.J. Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’ 26(3) 
World Competition (2003), p. 475. 
20 See, White Paper, s. 1.2. 
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The doctrine regarding the matter of private enforcement in Europe has been 
led by two distinct authors – A.P. Komninos and W.P.J. Wils. Therefore, in 
this thesis, their articles, books and opinions will be covered extensively. 
Nevertheless, other authors’ works participating in the discussion will also 
be presented, as well as some of the speeches of the former Competition 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes and the current Commissioner Joaquìn 
Almunia.  
 
1.5 Outline 
The thesis will be structured in the following way. At the outset, the system 
of private enforcement of antitrust law will be examined. This includes a 
thorough description of private enforcement, including its historic 
development through case law and the measures taken by the Commission. 
In addition, the arguments of those questioning the necessity of private 
enforcement will be presented.  
 
The next chapter turns to the matter of functions of private enforcement in 
the overall antitrust enforcement system. The aim of this is to understand, 
what role has been envisaged for the private damages claims. Also, the 
question is whether it is clear what kind of a relationship the two ‘limbs’ of 
enforcement have with each other and whether the Commission itself has 
figured out what purpose each of this method fulfils in the overall 
enforcement system. This analysis is indispensable for the outcome of the 
thesis, as after this has been carried out, it can then be determined, what 
areas need the most attention in the harmonisation process. 
 
In the subsequent chapter, the most important issue will be discussed – 
namely the effects of harmonisation of private enforcement on public 
enforcement. This chapter is divided into four subchapters covering the 
matters of binding effect on national competition authorities (hereinafter 
‘NCA’) decisions, leniency, access to evidence and finally fines and 
damages.  
 
The final chapter includes the concluding analysis of this topic and 
discusses how the proposals made in the White Paper influence the position 
of private enforcement in the overall antitrust enforcement system, including 
its interaction with public enforcement after the harmonisation.  
 8 
2 Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law 
As explained above, the enforcement model the Commission is striving for 
combines both public and private enforcement efforts to guarantee the best 
possible functioning of EU competition rules. As the problematic part of 
this equation is private enforcement, the latter must be analysed thoroughly. 
Public enforcement is already a well-developed functioning system and does 
not need special attention in this section.  
 
2.1 Definition 
In private enforcement the individual controls the proceedings and he may 
either appear as a plaintiff or as a defendant in a civil claim, while the 
competition rules may be both used as a ‘sword’ and as a ‘shield’.21  
 
The most obvious example of the use of competition law as a ‘sword’ is 
when a party claims damages suffered as a result of an infringement of 
competition law.
22
 However, as to the use of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU as a 
‘sword’, the Treaty is silent.23 This silence is the cause of the controversy 
surrounding the topic of private damages claims, leaving some 
commentators questioning whether this possibility should exist at all. These 
arguments will be presented in chapter 2.4. 
 
The antitrust prohibitions are used as a ‘shield’ when they are invoked in 
defence against a contractual claim for performance or for damages because 
of non-performance or against some other claim, for instance in an 
intellectual property infringement action.
24
 The use of Article 101 TFEU as 
a ‘shield’ in contractual disputes has its basis directly in the Treaty, more 
precisely in Article 101(2) TFEU, which provides for a voidness sanction. It 
is undoubtedly a useful and effective instrument to enforce the prohibition 
of restrictive agreements contained in Article 101 TFEU.
25
   
 
There is another way of dividing private actions into two distinct groups, 
namely stand-alone and follow-on actions. Follow-on actions are defined as 
cases in which the civil action is brought after a competition authority has 
found an infringement, meaning that they follow public enforcement 
                                               
21 V. Milutinović, The ‘right to damages’ under EU competition law: from Courage v. 
Crehan to the White Paper and beyond (Kluwer Law International, 2010), p. 13. 
22 M. Hazelhorst, ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: Why Punitive Damages 
Are a Step Too Far’, 19(4) ERPL (2010), p. 762. 
23 W.P.J. Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’ 26(3) 
World Competition (2003), p. 475. 
24 Ibid, p. 475. 
25 Ibid, pp. 474-475. 
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proceedings. Although the plaintiff in these cases can rely on the preceding 
investigation, he still has to show that he suffered a loss and that this loss 
was caused by the violation of a competition law provision. For stand-alone 
actions the definition is the following – actions, which do not necessitate a 
prior finding by a competition authority, but which are brought 
independently from public enforcement. In these cases, the plaintiff carries 
the additional burden of proving that there actually was a breach of 
competition law provisions. 
 
It has been argued that the only types of damages actions, which can be 
encouraged by legislative measures with realistic chances of success, are 
follow-on actions. These, however, have a limited enforcement value only, 
because from an enforcement perspective, there is no added value, as by 
definition, these damages relate to conduct which has already been 
terminated by administrative decisions.
26
 The Commission on the other 
hand finds the stand-alone and follow-on actions equally necessary from the 
perspective of enforcement and has issued the White Paper in regard to both 
of these.
27
 
 
The former EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes had strong belief 
in private enforcement and saw the benefits of it to EU competition. To put 
it in her own words: 
 
‘I am personally convinced that there is a lot of potential in advancing private 
enforcement of the European competition rules. … it could really contribute to our 
number one priority in Europe: creating a more competitive environment for 
business and industry, and thus growth and economic and social welfare for our 
citizens. …the threat of having to pay damages for the harm caused by an 
infringement of the competition rules has a strong additional deterrent effect.’28 
 
2.2 Development through Case Law 
As early as 1993, Advocate-General Van Gerven devoted most of his 
opinion in the Banks case to pleading for the necessity of the existence of a 
Community (now Union) right in damages for breaches of competition law, 
and to a detailed description of its legal regime.
29
 
 
He pointed out two very convincing arguments as to why private actions for 
damages should be made available under Community law. First, he claimed 
that awarding damages to the injured party is the only effective method 
                                               
26 T. Eilmansberger, ‘The Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules: reflections on the utility and feasibility of stimulating private enforcement through 
legislative action’, 44(2) CMLRev. (2007), pp. 477-478. 
27 White Paper, s. 1.2. 
28 N. Kroes, ‘Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition Rules in Europe’, 
22 September 2005, SPEECH/05/533. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/533 
29 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven on 27 October 1993 in Case C-128/92 Banks 
[1994] ECR I-1209, paras. 36-54. 
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whereby the national court can fully safeguard the directly effective 
provisions of Community law, which have been infringed upon. In addition, 
he found that such a rule on reparation plays a significant role in making the 
Community rules of competition more operational. He finished by stating: 
 
‘I conclude from the foregoing that the right to obtain reparation in respect of loss 
and damage sustained as a result of an undertaking’s infringement of Community 
competition rules which have direct effect is based on the Community legal order 
itself. Consequently, as a result of its obligation to ensure that Community law is 
fully effective and to protect the rights thereby conferred on individuals, the national 
court is under an obligation to award damages for loss sustained by an undertaking 
as a result of the breach by another undertaking of a directly effective provision of 
Community competition law.’30 
 
The Court did not discuss this matter in its judgment in Banks and it took 
the Court another eight years before they took a standpoint on the matter of 
private damages actions in Union law. 
 
The Courage v. Crehan
31
 judgment builds on earlier case law, most notably 
the Francovich
32
 and Brasserie du Pêcheur33 cases, in which the Court 
expressed the principle of State liability for breaches of Community (now 
Union) law.
34
 In Courage v. Crehan, this line of reasoning is extended to 
private parties, and it is expressed as a matter of principle, which eliminated 
uncertainty and gave an important signal to national courts.
35
 
 
The most important statement made by the Court in this case is that: 
 
‘The full effectiveness of Article 85 [now Art 101 TFEU] … would be put at risk if 
it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a 
contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.’36 
 
Since the Court’s clarification in Courage v. Crehan damages claims have a 
solid foundation in Union law, notwithstanding the silence of the TFEU. 
However, even if many were hoping for it, it did not turn out to be the case, 
which ‘banged the bell’, triggering a wave of antitrust damages litigation in 
Europe.
37
 Such an expectation was unrealistic from the outset. On the 
contrary, it would have been quite surprising if this case alone had managed 
to bring about a significant increase in such actions.
38
  
 
                                               
30 Ibid, para. 45. 
31 Case C-453/99 Courage v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297. 
32 Joined cases C-6/90 and 9-/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357. 
33 Joined cases C-46/93 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029. 
34 M. Hazelhorst, ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: Why Punitive Damages 
Are a Step Too Far’, 19(4) ERPL (2010), p. 762. 
35 A.P. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement – Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts (Hart, 2008), p. 171. 
36 Case C-453/99 Courage v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, para. 26. 
37 T. Eilmansberger, ‘The Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules: reflections on the utility and feasibility of stimulating private enforcement through 
legislative action’, 44(2) CMLRev. (2007), p. 433. 
38 Ibid, p. 433. 
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The impact of the clarification that such claims arise as a matter of Union 
law was bound to be limited, since the principle that a violation of Article 
101 and 102 TFEU could give rise to damages claims never truly seemed to 
be in dispute. Jones, for example, found already before the Courage v. 
Crehan case that the right to private enforcement actions comes from the 
guiding principles of Union law.
39
 Reich found that whether such a right 
exists is a question of effective legal protection.
40
 Eilmansberger concluded 
that it was not the uncertainty regarding the existence of these claims, but 
unfavourable or restrictive elements of this remedy, a lack of clarity as to its 
application, and a general reluctance to use that weapon that were 
restraining potential plaintiffs.
41
 The Court in Courage v. Crehan, however, 
did not address any of these restraints or concerns. Therefore, it should not 
have been unexpected that there was not a big change in the number of 
private actions for damages. 
 
The next judgment from the Court regarding the matter of damages actions 
was Manfredi
42
. There the Court, in addition to emphasising the importance 
of existence of damages claims went further by clarifying also what kind of 
damages must be compensated. The Court stated that that injured persons 
must be able to seek compensation not only for actual loss but also for loss 
of profit plus interest.
43
 As regards to exemplary or punitive damages, the 
Court found that if these damages are available in domestic actions similar 
to actions founded on the Union competition rules, it must also be possible 
to award such damages in actions founded on Union rules.
44
 Those 
expecting something revolutionary regarding private damages claims to 
come from this case were disappointed, but then again, it is not up to the 
Court to create new law, but to interpret the existing rules.  
 
2.3 White Paper and its Aftermath 
In 2008, the Commission finally issued the White Paper, which entailed a 
number of measures to be taken in order to ‘overcome the current 
ineffectiveness of antitrust damages actions’45 and to ensure that all victims 
of infringements of EC (now EU) competition law can fully be compensated 
for their harm.
46
 This means that full compensation is, the first and foremost 
guiding principle.
47
 Nevertheless, the enforcement idea, put forward in the 
                                               
39 C.A. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA 
(Oxford, 1999), p. 46. 
40 N. Reich, ‘The ‘Courage’ Doctrine: Encouraging or Discouraging Compensation for 
Antitrust Injuries?’ 42(1) CMLRev. (2005), p. 39. 
41 T. Eilmansberger, ‘The Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules: reflections on the utility and feasibility of stimulating private enforcement through 
legislative action’, 44(2) CMLRev. (2007), p. 433. 
42 Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619. 
43 Ibid, para. 100. 
44 Ibid, para. 99. 
45 White Paper, s. 1.1. 
46 Ibid, s. 1.2. 
47 See, ibid, s. 1.2. 
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Commission’s previous Green Paper,48 had not completely disappeared in 
the White Paper. The Commission indeed pointed out that more effective 
compensatory mechanisms will increase detection of competition law 
infringements as well as the likeliness that infringers will be held liable. 
Better compensatory mechanisms will therefore have an inherently 
beneficial effect in terms of compliance with the competition rules and 
deterrence of future infringements.
49
 This tension between the two functions 
(compensation and deterrence) will be further discussed in chapters 3 and 4 
of this thesis.  
 
As soon as the White Paper was issued, commentators started to point out 
the mistakes the Commission had done in drafting it. One of the misses 
pointed out was that the White Paper appeared to underestimate the possible 
consequences arising from the concurrent existence of public and private 
enforcement, such as the need for a mechanism that would prevent over-
enforcement and rules that would regulate all the aspects arising out of the 
interaction among the various enforcement means.
50
 Surely, one can see that 
coordination is needed for example between fines and damages, which will 
be discussed in chapter 4.4.3.  
 
Another mistake the Commission made already in the Green Paper and 
repeated when issuing the White Paper was the failure to provide a reason 
for needing legislative action in this area on Union level. Therefore, by not 
indicating a clear need for legislative intervention, the Commission may 
have done itself a considerable disservice. For the credibility of a project as 
significant as the White Paper, it is imperative that the Commission proves a 
sound basis.
51
 
 
There is a further reason for the growing resistance against the 
Commission’s initiative. Namely, almost all Member States have raised 
questions as to the Commission’s authority to introduce legislation to 
facilitate antitrust damage claims. Some Member States have expressly 
rejected the necessity of European legislative measures.
52
 The opposition of 
Member States to legislative action on Union level is understandable, when 
looking at the effects the harmonisation process would have on their tort law 
systems. At the moment, most of the Member States do not have a self-
standing competition law regulation for private actions for damages coming 
                                               
48 Green Paper, s. 1.1. 
49 White Paper, s. 1.2. 
50 J. Kloub, ‘White Paper on damage actions for breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Plea for 
a More Holistic Approach to Antitrust Enforcement’, 5(2) European Competition Journal 
(2009), p. 543. 
51 J.S. Kortmann and Ch.R.A. Swaak, ‘The EC White Paper on antitrust damage actions: 
why the Member States are (right to be) less than enthusiastic’, 30(7) ECLR (2009), p. 350. 
52 See for example, Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the 
Federal Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection and the Bundeskartellamt on the EU Commission’s White Paper on ‘Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments/bund_en.
pdf.  
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from competition law breaches. Instead, they are dealt with under the 
existing tort law regulation. 
 
Therefore, the proposed measures in the White Paper cut across some 
substantial differences between the tort law systems of the various Member 
States. It should not be too difficult to comprehend that by introducing a 
separate, supranational set of rules for antitrust damages – even if they are 
just ‘minimum rules’ – the Commission is bound to create an imbalance on 
the national level.
53
 Inevitably these changes will not be warmly welcomed 
by the Member States. To conclude this discussion one could find that so far 
the Commission has not demonstrated that the reforms it is advocating are 
necessary or even desirable.
54
 
 
Eilmansberger commented already after the issuing of the Green Paper that 
the creation of a special regime for antitrust torts is not necessary.
55
 He 
criticized the Commission’s proposal on the grounds that the rules 
governing torts in general are perfectly suitable for cartel damages claims as 
well and that there is no reason why the principles governing the 
development of regular torts should not be applicable in antitrust context. 
He explained that these rules and principles are the result of a long and on-
going jurisdictional development, which seeks to balance the interests of the 
plaintiff and the defendant on the one hand, and the public interest in 
encouraging or restricting such claims on the other.
56
  
 
The Commission did not let this opposition by the Member States and 
scholars stop it from its mission and soon after publishing the White Paper 
what appears to be a draft ‘Proposal for a Directive on Rules Governing 
Damages Actions for Infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’ was 
leaked.
57
 While currently its status is unclear, the contents of this document 
suggest that the Commission intends to press ahead and introduce far-
reaching legislative measures to facilitate antitrust damage claims, as 
contemplated in the White Paper.
58
 
 
2.4 No Need for Private Enforcement?  
For the sake of explaining the whole spectrum of arguments in relation to 
private enforcement, it is necessary to present the points made by those, 
                                               
53 J.S. Kortmann and Ch.R.A. Swaak, ‘The EC White Paper on antitrust damage actions: 
why the Member States are (right to be) less than enthusiastic’, 30(7) ECLR (2009), p. 341. 
54 Ibid, p. 341. 
55 T. Eilmansberger, ‘The Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules: reflections on the utility and feasibility of stimulating private enforcement through 
legislative action’, 44(2) CMLRev. (2007), p. 442. 
56 Ibid, p. 442. 
57 The Draft is not publicly available. 
58 J.S. Kortmann and Ch.R.A. Swaak, ‘The EC White Paper on antitrust damage actions: 
why the Member States are (right to be) less than enthusiastic’, 30(7) ECLR (2009), p. 341. 
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who do not see any use for private actions in the overall enforcement 
system.  
 
Most prominent representative of the anti-private enforcement authors is 
Wils. He argued that in order to ensure that the antitrust prohibitions are not 
violated, public antitrust enforcement is inherently superior to private 
enforcement. The explanation for such a standpoint was that public 
enforcement has more effective investigative and sanctioning powers than 
private and also because private actions are driven by profit motives, which 
fundamentally diverge from the general interest in this area. He did not even 
see private enforcement having a supplementary role, as according to him 
the adequate level of sanctions and the adequate number and variety of 
prosecutions could be ensured more effectively and at a lower cost through 
public enforcement.
59
 
 
This total negation of the necessity of private enforcement received backing 
up from German scholars. Böge and Ost  argued that punishing competition 
law infringements is not a task of ‘private attorneys-general’ but needs to  
remain under the sole control of competition authorities. Their reasoning 
was that these authorities have better facilities for investigations and 
establishing proof, which are not available to private parties. In addition, 
they contended that competition authorities are better suited for 
safeguarding the public interest, as they saw public and private interests to 
be conflicting,
60
 hence not pursuing the same ultimate goal of effective 
competition. The issue of clashes between public and private enforcement 
will be further explained in the fourth chapter. 
 
Terhechte expressed the concern that if national courts were to start 
applying EU competition law rules, the result would be that the 
interpretation of competition rules could not be subjected to control in many 
situations, which would lead to differentiation.
61
 He found that from the 
perspective of uniform application of European law, this scenario remains 
problematic.
62
 However, this issue is not as serious as to justify a total 
negation of private enforcement. It could be solved by providing more 
training for the national judges on competition law. 
 
In contrast, Jones argues that Wils’ arguments contra private enforcement 
would seem more suited for a policy debate where there must be a choice 
made between only public enforcement or only private.
63
 However, nothing 
of the like was ever suggested by the Commission or other commentators. 
                                               
59 W.P.J. Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’ 26(3) 
World Competition (2003), p. 488. 
60 U. Böge and K. Ost, ‘Up and running, or is it? Private enforcement – the situation in 
Germany and policy perspectives’, 27(4) ECLR (2006), p. 198. 
61 J.P. Terhechte, ‘Enforcing European Competition Law – Harmonizing Private and Public 
Approaches in a More Differentiated Enforcement Model’ in J. Basedow, J.P. Terhechte 
and L. Tichy (eds.), Private Enforcement of Competition Law (Nomos, 2011), p. 18. 
62 Ibid, p. 18. 
63 C.A. Jones, ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality 
Check’, 27(1) World Competition (2004), p. 19. 
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Therefore, eventually Wils backed down from his harsh position regarding 
the (non-)necessity of private enforcement. Instead, like Komninos earlier, 
he also formulated three tasks that enforcement of antitrust law pursues,
64
 
and continued by comparing the effectiveness of two enforcement methods 
in relation to these tasks. He concluded that public antitrust enforcement is 
the superior instrument to pursue the objectives of clarification and 
development of the law and of deterrence and punishment, whereas private 
actions for damages are superior for the pursuit of corrective justice through 
compensation.
65
  
 
To conclude from the above, it is not an option for the Member States to 
exchange public enforcement for private enforcement, but instead, they 
should provide for deterrent administrative sanctions and facilitate private 
damages actions.
66
 However, in the discussions about how the interaction 
between private and public enforcement should best be described, there is 
one thing that cannot be denied – the EU model of enforcement of 
competition rules is predominantly an administrative one and that this is not 
likely to change. How private damages actions fit into this system is the 
topic handled in the next chapter. 
 
                                               
64 W.P.J. Wils, ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private 
Actions for Damages’, 32(1) World Competition (2009), p. 5: the enforcement of antitrust 
prohibitions involves three tasks: (1) clarifying and developing the content of the 
prohibitions, (2) preventing violations of these prohibitions, in particular through deterrence 
and punishment, and (3) dealing with the consequences when violations have nevertheless 
happened, in particular by providing compensation to achieve corrective justice. 
65 W.P.J. Wils, ‘The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private 
Actions for Damages’, 32(1) World Competition (2009), p. 12. 
66 M.J. Frese, ‘Fines and Damages under EU Competition Law: Implications of the 
Accumulation of Liability’, 34(3) World Competition (2011), p. 408. 
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3 Functions of Private 
Enforcement in the Antitrust 
Enforcement System 
To begin tackling this matter, it is important to establish what the objectives 
are that the enforcement of competition law fulfils. Komninos on this point 
brings out three objectives-functions, which according to him are 
systematically different and yet substantively interconnected.
67
 The first one 
is injunctive, i.e. to bring the infringement of the law to an end, which may 
entail not only negative measures, in the sense of an order to abstain from 
the delinquent conduct, but also positive ones to ensure that such conduct 
cease in the future. The second objective-function is restorative or 
compensatory, i.e. to remedy the injury caused by the specific anti-
competitive conduct. The third one is punitive, i.e. to punish the infringer 
and also to deter him and others from future infringements.
68
 In an ideal 
enforcement system, these three functions are pursued with a combination 
of both public and private elements. 
 
However, as the system now stands, there is very little regulation regarding 
the matter of how the two enforcement methods interact with each other in 
practice. This is true even though there are widely recognised areas where 
the interests of public and private enforcement potentially collide.
69
 
Commission is clearly worried and not sure itself how to address the 
relationship between private and public enforcement. Quite recently in the 
Commission Staff Working Document, Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress (Collective Redress Working Document), 
the Commission consults stakeholders on this matter.
70
 Regardless of the 
Commission’ efforts, from the perspective of this thesis, it is indispensable 
to determine what functions private damages actions fill in the overall 
enforcement system.  
 
It has been argued from the start that private enforcement primarily serves 
the restorative-compensatory objective, meaning that these private actions 
                                               
67 A.P. Komninos, ‘Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement: quod Dei Deo, 
quod Caesaris Caesari’, 16th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop 
‘Integrating public and private enforcement of competition law: Implications for courts and 
agencies’, Florence, 17-18 June 2011, p. 2. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1870723 
68 Ibid, p. 2 
69 J. Kloub, ‘White Paper on damage actions for breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Plea for 
a More Holistic Approach to Antitrust Enforcement’, 5(2) European Competition Journal 
(2009), p. 537. 
70 SEC(2011)173, 04.02.2011. Questions included: Should private collective redress be 
independent of, complementary to, or subsidiary to enforcement by public bodies? Is there 
need for coordination between private collective redress and public enforcement?  If yes, 
how can this coordination be achieved? 
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ensure compensation for those harmed by anti-competitive conduct.
71
 The 
role of public enforcement here can only be minimal. 
 
In addition to the compensatory function, private enforcement serves a 
number of other functions. First, it eases the burden on competition 
authorities, as due to limited resources these have to make choices which 
cases to take on. Thus, private litigants help to close gaps in the overall 
competition enforcement system. In addition, the considerable number of 
private law proceedings contributes to further developing antitrust law. 
Finally, the possible accumulation of fines and claims for damages enhances 
deterrence and thereby strengthens the overall antitrust culture.
72
 
 
3.1 Compensation v. Deterrence 
The Commission in its Green Paper followed the Court’s line of 
argumentation, when it expressed that both public and private enforcement 
are part of a common enforcement system and serve the same aims: to deter 
anti-competitive practices forbidden by antitrust law and to protect firms 
and consumers from these practices and any damages caused by them.
73
 
Private as well as public enforcement of antitrust law were seen as an 
important tool to create and sustain a competitive economy.
74
 At that point, 
it was clear that the Commission looked at private enforcement as a mere 
enforcement tool to increase deterrence. As stated earlier, the Commission 
changed its view on damages actions in the White Paper, but still did not let 
go of the deterrence as one function of these actions. 
 
Commentators have argued that the main purpose of private enforcement is 
the attainment of corrective justice through compensation: the possibility to 
obtain redress is not (only) to act as deterrent, but rather to make good for 
any losses the infringement has caused on the part of any innocent victim.
75
 
Under this view, deterrence is just a socially beneficial by-product of such 
damages claims as it increases the probability of detection and the expected 
cost of violations.
76
 Also, the main difficulty with an approach to damages 
actions focusing on deterrence and punishment is that it would become an 
alternative, rather than a complement, to public enforcement.
77
 However, 
this is not the outcome, which competition law should be striving for. 
 
                                               
71 A.P. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement – Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts (Hart, 2008), p. 8. 
72 U. Böge and K. Ost, ‘Up and running, or is it? Private enforcement – the situation in 
Germany and policy perspectives’, 27(4) ECLR (2006), p. 197. 
73 Green Paper, s. 1.1. 
74 Ibid, s. 1.1. 
75 P. Nebbia, ‘Damages actions for the infringement of EC competition law: compensation 
or deterrence?’ 33(1) ELRev. (2008), p. 26. 
76 Ibid, p. 26. 
77 E. Gippini-Fournier, ‘The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First 
Experiences with Regulation 1/2003’, Community Report to the FIDE Congress 2008, 
p. 132. 
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All in all, it is not correct to view public and private enforcement as 
pursuing separate goals (principally deterrence in the case of the former and 
compensation in the case of the latter), as they work jointly towards 
achieving the ultimate goal of enforceability of antitrust rules, under which 
both compensation and deterrence are subsumed.
78
 
 
3.2 Complementarity 
While it is sometimes argued that private enforcement cannot make a 
substantial contribution to competition law enforcement,
79
 mainstream 
antitrust scholars still see the ideal antitrust enforcement model combining 
both public and private elements. The reason for this is that each of the two 
systems aims at different aspects of the same phenomenon, hence they are to 
be seen as complementary and necessary for the effectiveness of the whole 
competition law enforcement.
80
 
 
The current view of the Commission on the matter of complementarity of 
private enforcement in relation to public enforcement is expressed in the 
White Paper. As opposed to the Green Paper where deterrence was 
emphasised, in the White Paper, the right to full compensation of the 
victims was set out as the goal. Regarding the relationship between the two 
enforcement methods, it is stated that those measures in the White Paper are 
designed to create an effective system of private enforcement by means of 
damages actions that complements, but does not replace or jeopardise, 
public enforcement.
81
 Thus, it is clear that the Commission looks at the right 
of victims of a competition law infringement to bring an action for damages 
as being also in the public interest.
82
 It can be concluded from this that the 
Commission really does see private and public enforcement working 
towards the same goal of optimal antitrust enforcement. 
 
The Court’s standpoint has been consistent in its case law, as it has 
acknowledged that individual damages actions strengthen the working of the 
Union competition rules and can make a significant contribution to the 
maintenance of effective competition in the Union.
83
 This is a case where 
                                               
78 J. Kloub, ‘White Paper on damage actions for breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Plea for 
a More Holistic Approach to Antitrust Enforcement’, 5(2) European Competition Journal 
(2009), p. 546. 
79 This is said especially by public enforcement officials; see most notably W.P.J. Wils, 
‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’ 26(3) World 
Competition (2003). 
80 A.P. Komninos, ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? 
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81 White Paper, s. 1.3.  
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the private interest contributes to the safeguarding of the public interest, so 
no antimony should exist. Thus, private actions should not be seen as 
altering the substance of EU competition law, which is the protection of the 
public interest.
84
  
 
To understand where and why the notion of complementarity comes into 
play, the benefits of both enforcement methods will briefly be presented. 
First argument for private enforcement is that it is not politically influenced. 
Furthermore, it enhances awareness of competition law of private market 
actors. When private claimants do bring an action, their specific market 
knowledge can be made use of.
 85
 Additionally, the possibility of receiving 
compensation contributes positively to the critical risk level of private 
actors. In the antitrust context, this is a worthy goal as both competitors and 
customers can conduct their operations in the most efficient manner based 
on relative indifference to antitrust violations due to the credible promise of 
compensation.
86
 Moreover, damages actions have deterrence as a beneficial 
side effect.
87
 These factors brought out here are the most important when it 
comes to the justifications of the complementary existence of private 
enforcement to act as a safeguard against potential insufficiencies in public 
enforcement. 
 
However, private enforcement does not constitute a systematic, methodical 
approach. That is where the pros of public enforcement come into play by 
offering better methods of investigation and detection of infringements. 
Furthermore, the costs of information and transaction are lower, one of the 
reasons for this being that more specialized units decide.
88
 However, even 
the lower costs do not help with the fact that in reality public enforcement 
has limited finances and is hindered by other factors, such as agency 
problems and political economy.
89
 Thus, it becomes apparent that for an 
optimal enforcement system, both public and private enforcement are 
necessary, as they help to overcome each other’s flaws and do work for the 
same ultimate goal of effective competition in the market. 
 
Nevertheless, the discussion is not over with the simple finding of 
complementarity, because this complementarity has its limitations. There 
                                               
84 A.P. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement – Decentralised Application of EC 
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(2009), pp. 526. 
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are several possible scenarios where actions of individuals, taken in 
furtherance of their own private interests, may be of little use to the overall 
goal of effective enforcement and may actually harm it. Equally, one could 
envisage circumstances whereby public enforcement efforts harm the 
protection of private rights and/or interests.
90
 These two scenarios will 
further be developed in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
 
Komninos sums up the complementarity argument by finding that an 
effective system of private enforcement does not alter the basic goal of the 
competition rules, which is to safeguard the public interest in maintaining a 
free and undistorted competition, and should by no means be thought of as 
antagonistic to the public enforcement model. Therefore, it should be 
possible for the two models to work to complement each other.
91
 
 
3.3 Filling the Enforcement Gap 
A further advantage is that the weakness of public enforcement, most 
notably the ‘enforcement gap’ generated by the perceived inability of public 
enforcement to deal with all attention-worthy cases, are counter-balanced by 
strengthening private enforcement. Another advantage may be that a mixed 
public-private system of antitrust enforcement may lead to a more balanced 
way of enforcing the competition rules, thus avoiding the more intervention-
oriented approach of a system where public agencies are the exclusive 
enforcers.
92
 
 
On the other hand, not everyone agrees that just because all antitrust 
violations are not detected and punished, it justifies the conclusion that 
private actions for damages would be needed to fill a deterrence gap, 
because most probably it is not even in the general interest.
93
 Wils argues 
that rather it is important that the expected penalty exceeds the expected 
gains coming from the antitrust infringements.
94
 
 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that not every infringement of the EU 
competition law rules causes harm. Therefore, there is a need for an 
enforcement system, which is not conditional on the existence of any harm. 
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However, the traditional distinction
95
 has the effect that a claim for damages 
is generally conditional on the establishment of harm (what else is there to 
compensate?).
96
 On the other hand, public enforcement of antitrust law does 
not require that a specific infringement cause actual harm to a person in 
order to prohibit it; it is sufficient that the object of the agreement is anti-
competitive. In addition, due to the de minimis
97
 rules, an agreement might 
cause harm, but still not be considered anti-competitive because it does not 
have an appreciable effect on the competition in the market.
98
 This means 
that even when the two enforcement methods are both equally accessible, 
there are cases in which only one of them can be used. 
 
The conclusion from the above must be that it is not possible to exchange 
public enforcement for private enforcement due to their specific 
characteristics and the complementary but different functions they have to 
fulfil. Therefore, both enforcement methods are indispensable to guarantee 
an effective and optimal enforcement system. How to balance the two 
methods in order to achieve such a system is another matter. 
                                               
95 By the traditional distinction is meant that private enforcement has a compensatory 
function and public enforcement serves the objective of deterrence.  
96 M.J. Frese, ‘Fines and Damages under EU Competition Law: Implications of the 
Accumulation of Liability’, 34(3) World Competition (2011), p. 412. 
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minimis), OJ C 368, 22.12.2001. 
98 A.P. Komninos, ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? 
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4 Interaction between Private 
and Public Enforcement after 
the Harmonisation 
The White Paper addressed several issues in relation to private damages 
actions, which are not all relevant to the interaction of private and public 
enforcement. There are four key issues, which illustrate best how the two 
enforcement methods are meant to interact with each other if the proposals 
made by the Commission become hard-law in the form envisaged in the 
White Paper. 
 
The first is the issue of binding effect of NCA decisions, as in addition to 
facilitating follow-on actions for damages, it also gives some of the control 
over which cases will be pursued by private actors to public 
administrators.
99
 Second, the matter of leniency is probably the area, where 
public enforcement will suffer the most due to the strengthening of private 
enforcement. This is due to the fact that once the leniency applicant 
becomes publicly known, it is an easy target for the victims to bring to 
court, thereby decreasing the attractiveness of leniency programmes. The 
third issue is partly related to the second, as the danger of victims accessing 
the competition authorities’ files could seriously threaten leniency 
programmes. By giving private parties the possibility of disclosure inter 
partes in civil claims, leniency applicants will be less exposed. As the fourth 
matter, the relationship between fines and damages will be examined. It 
cannot be denied that after the harmonisation, the number of private 
damages actions is expected to grow, which brings with it greater financial 
distress for the infringers, thus making coordination necessary.   
 
4.1 Binding Effect of NCA Decisions 
At the moment, according to Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003 only the 
decisions of the Commission regarding infringements of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU have binding effects on national competition authorities and 
national courts. The idea brought forward in the White Paper would extend 
this binding effect also to the decisions made by national competition 
authorities. The Commission worded the rule as follows:  
 
‘National courts that have to rule in actions for damages on practices under Article 
81 or 82 on which an NCA in the ECN has already given a final decision finding an 
infringement of those articles, or on which a review court has given a final judgment 
upholding the NCA decision or itself finding an infringement, cannot take decisions 
running counter to any such decision or ruling.’100 
                                               
99 The possibility of bringing a stand-alone claim still exists. 
100 White Paper, s. 2.3. 
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The principle of binding effect of Commission decisions was developed by 
the Court in the Masterfoods
101
 decision. Therefore, when the Commission 
was drafting the Regulation 1/2003 it got the inspiration and ‘permission’ 
from the Court for wording the binding effect provision as it did. When the 
time came to draft the White Paper on damages actions, the Commission 
dared to go even a step further and make decisions of NCAs also binding. It 
can be speculated that this provision was lobbied for very strongly by 
Germany, who has had such a provision – § 33(4) GWB102 – in force 
already from 2005.  
  
As to the wording of the provision, it must be noted that the Commission 
made a conscious decision when it used the expression ‘cannot take 
decisions running counter to’ instead of ‘binding’. This can be traced back 
to the Masterfoods judgment, where the Court did not use the word 
‘binding’ either.103 Komninos concluded from this selection of the 
expression by the Court that national courts must not always consider 
themselves positively bound by Commission decisions.
104
 There is no 
reason why the same conclusion should not be applicable in relation to the 
binding effect of NCA decisions. The issue of the scope of the binding 
effect will be explained further below. 
 
The rationale behind the idea of making NCA decisions also binding could 
be explained by the principle of economy in legal proceedings, which makes 
it inappropriate to repeat parts of the procedure before a civil generalist 
court, if a specialist authority or court has already dealt with the same 
facts.
105
 
 
4.1.1 Scope of Binding Effect 
The question now arises that where a previous relevant decision has been 
taken by a national competition authority, how far does a court, in front of 
which a damages claim is being tried, have to follow? 
 
The Commission gave an explanation regarding this question and stated that 
the probative effects of a NCA decision are confined to the scope of the 
decision.
106
 The Commission explained that this limitation covers the 
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material (same agreement, decisions or practices), personal (same 
infringers) and also the territorial scope of the decision.
107
 Thus, a decision 
of a NCA finding an infringement of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU can only 
refer to those anticompetitive effects that took place within the jurisdiction 
of that NCA.
108
 In the Staff Working Paper, it was made clear that this latter 
territorial limitation does not however influence the possibility of using the 
NCA decision from one Member State as proof of infringement in a civil 
claim in another Member State.
109
  
 
This limitation in scope is not always unproblematic and may raise 
questions whether it makes sense to interpret the personal and material 
scope strictly in all cases. For example, in cases of distribution networks, 
where one distributor complains about the terms, the binding effect of the 
NCA decision would cover only the particular agreement. However, this 
could be questionable when all distribution agreements are ‘identical’ and/or 
when the NCA decision on the particular complaint includes findings 
touching upon anticompetitive practices relevant throughout the network of 
distributors.
110
 
 
Although no such clarification is included in the Staff Working Paper, it 
should undoubtedly be accepted that the claimant filing for an action at a 
time when the NCA decision has not yet become final may still use this 
NCA decision as evidence of the infringement.
111
 The national court in front 
of which the case is being tried will be free to assess the probative value of 
the NCA decision. Based on this assessment the civil court may choose to 
follow the NCA’s finding on the basis of its de facto persuasive authority. 
However, there is no binding effect on the civil court during that time and 
the court may deviate as it deems appropriate. 
 
One further point clarified in the Staff Working Paper is that a decision 
made by a NCA is only binding as far as it finds an infringement.
112
 
Meaning that if a NCA accepts commitments by companies instead of 
proceeding to a finding of infringement, and closes the administrative 
proceedings, then it does not affect the national civil courts, which remain 
free to decide whether or not there has been an infringement of Union 
competition law.
113
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4.1.2 Implications of Binding Effect 
One of the most important benefits achieved by extending the binding effect 
from only Commission decisions to final decisions of (domestic and 
foreign) NCAs in the European Competition Network (and as has already 
been enacted in some Member States), is that follow-on actions for damages 
will be further assisted.
114
 
 
The burden on the claimants will be eased, as in the follow-on action they 
only need to establish the harm they have suffered and the causal link 
between the infringement and this harm.
115
 Nevertheless, the potential 
claimants need to take into account the limitations of the scope of the 
binding effect of NCA decisions, as noted above.  
 
The Commission sees the benefit of encouraging follow-on actions as 
offering the best guarantees in preventing abusive litigation and preserving 
the effectiveness of public enforcement, because these actions are brought 
only against companies that a public authority has already found guilty of 
infringing EU law.
116
 Thus, this would count as an indirect advantage 
deriving from the binding effect of NCA decisions.  
 
There are advantages also for the national courts, as the binding effect of 
foreign NCAs will relieve them from the difficult task of having to make 
investigations abroad in order to establish the existence and scope of an 
infringement in cross-border situations.
117
 Moreover, the commentators 
agree on that the binding effect of NCA decisions will procure cost- and 
time-saving benefits, will reduce the risk for the claimant and thus 
encourage follow-on antitrust litigation, and will enhance legal certainty and 
the uniform application of EU competition law by precluding conflicting 
decisions issued by administrative and civil courts.
118
 
 
However, not all commentators see the increasing number of follow-on 
actions as something positive. Wilsher finds that the ‘free-rider’ problem is 
serious in this area, as many large companies seek to use public authorities 
to do the hard work of enforcement for them.
119
 This on its turn distorts the 
‘market’ for competition enforcement because it reduces the costs that firms 
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have to pay for enforcement without adequate justification, hence altering 
the risk-reward calculus that every litigant has to engage in.
120
 Nevertheless, 
this concern is hard to understand, as in the context of competition law 
enforcement, it is the task of the NCA to find the infringers and punish 
them. The NCA has this assignment regardless of whether or not there is a 
large company who can bring a follow-on action.  
 
4.1.3 Potential Concerns 
At this point, it is important to bring out the argument made by Komninos, 
who was not always convinced that benefits of the binding effect outweigh 
the negative sides. He claimed that allowing litigants to rebut the 
presumption established by an infringement decision would enrich national 
litigation, as national civil courts could be fully involved in the application 
of substantive competition law and would not be turned into mere assessors 
of damages.
121
 However, Komninos’ concerns about the weakened position 
of national courts in competition law matters have changed, as he conceded 
in his latest article that he also understands benefits for claimants gained 
from not having to re-argue the case in civil court.
122
 Furthermore, he 
admitted that when a competition authority has decided in a judicially-
reviewable final decision that there has been an infringement, there is a 
valid reason for not allowing the defendant to challenge anew this cardinal 
finding.
123
 However, he still remains sceptical about giving unqualified 
binding effect to administrative decisions and pleads for a rebuttable 
presumption of antitrust liability. 
 
The second concern is that the binding effect works only in one direction, 
meaning that NCA decisions are binding on civil courts but not the other 
way around. Thus, when a claimant has brought a stand-alone action for 
damages, where the national court has found to be a competition law 
infringement, then it does not automatically oblige or give a right to the 
NCA to fine the infringer. However, when considering the limited resources 
of public enforcers, the latter need to retain their discretion whether to start 
proceedings or not. In addition, the de minimis rules also set a limit to the 
cases in which proceedings can be brought. Therefore, it is necessary that 
the binding effect only works in one way.  
 
Thirdly, it cannot be ignored that there are different standards of proof, 
procedural rights and review mechanisms of NCA decisions in the Member 
States. In relation to this, commentators have expressed the fear that the 
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binding effect rule could encourage undesirable forum shopping.
124
 Even if 
there is a danger of forum shopping, there could be measures taken to avoid 
this possibility without jeopardizing the binding effect of NCA decisions.  
 
Fourth, fears exist regarding practical difficulties in the implementation of 
this binding effect rule, which relate to the fact that national courts would 
have to tackle the problem of decisions written in a foreign language and 
against the background of a different legal system and culture.
125
 These 
minor difficulties should however not hinder potential claimants or national 
courts from using foreign NCA decisions in civil claims.  
 
As a conclusion from the concerns given, one can see that these are mostly 
related to procedural issues. However, these should not discourage the 
Commission from proceeding with the idea of giving binding effect to NCA 
decisions. Nevertheless, these issues still need to be taken into consideration 
and a solution for these has to be developed along with the new directive. 
 
4.2 Leniency 
The general idea behind leniency programmes in antitrust enforcement is to 
grant immunity from penalties or the reduction of penalties for antitrust 
violations in exchange for cooperation with the antitrust enforcement 
authorities.
126
 
 
In Europe, the rather under-developed state of private enforcement was not 
considered to deter companies from applying for leniency, so until very 
recently no case had been made for imposing limitations on private actions in 
cases of leniency applications.
127
 However, when the Commission set out to 
strengthen private enforcement actions, it had no choice but to tackle the issues 
arising from the concurrent existence of leniency programmes and private 
actions for damages.  
 
4.2.1 Relationship between Leniency 
Programmes and Damages Claims 
As a general starting point, it is important to understand that the issue of 
reduction of fines must be distinguished from the compensation issue. 
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Otherwise, linking the two would amount to a contract at the expense of 
third parties (the victims) between the authority and the wrongdoer.
128
 
 
The European Commission in the Leniency Notice took the separation of 
the two notions into account when it explicitly stated that the ‘fact that 
immunity or reduction in respect of fines is granted cannot protect an 
undertaking from the civil law consequences of its participation in an 
infringement of Article 81 EC’129 (now Article 101 TFEU). 
 
However, ever since the Court recognised the right of ‘any individual’ to 
obtain compensation for damage suffered due to an infringement of the EU 
competition rules and the active promotion of private enforcement actions 
by the Commission, the risk of exposure for leniency applicants has been 
increasing continuously.
130
 It is therefore understandable that it may 
discourage cartel participants from applying for leniency, which would 
significantly impede the discovery and punishment of cartels, which in turn 
would lead to a lower degree of compensation of cartel damage.
131
 Hence, 
by trying to advance private enforcement actions, the Commission might be 
doing the victims a disservice instead, if it fails to come up with a solution, 
which would satisfy leniency applicants and at the same time still be helpful 
in private damages actions. 
 
Another reason why private enforcement is making leniency programmes 
risky for undertakings, is because after applying for leniency the cartel 
offenders become publicly known. Thus, when potential claimants want to 
sue the infringers, they are able to identify the infringing undertakings and 
go to court themselves.
132
 Furthermore, it can hardly be denied that the more 
likely competition law offenders have to pay damages, the less they will be 
inclined to make their breach of competition law known to any public 
authority.
133
 In this situation, it is clear that private enforcement of 
competition rules would hinder public enforcement, which is nowadays 
relying heavily on discovery through leniency programmes. 
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The concerns grow even bigger, because when a firm files a successful 
application for immunity, it is exposed, at least temporarily, to the risk of 
being held liable under civil law for the entire cartel.
134
 Such a firm is likely 
to be the primary or even exclusive target of private damages actions, as this 
firm is often the only cartel member not contesting the existence and 
illegality of the cartel.
135
 Therefore, cartelists who refuse to cooperate with 
the authorities or who only submit enough evidence to achieve a reduction 
of the fine rather than full immunity may therefore be better off, in terms of 
civil liability, than the successful applicant for immunity.
136
 This is reducing 
incentives of infringers to file for leniency as the first applicant, which is the 
most crucial for the discovery of a cartel. 
 
Eilmansberger finds that the argument that an increased threat of damages 
claims does not fundamentally affect the prisoners’ dilemma faced by cartel 
members lacks substance.
137
 He explains that the risk of a successful follow-
on damages claim being brought changes the overall calculations of a 
potential leniency applicant, as any advantage gained with regard to 
administrative fines would be outweighed by the disadvantage created by a 
the damages payment in civil actions.
138
 
 
4.2.2 Protecting Corporate Statements  
As can be concluded from the above, it is exactly the threat of follow-on 
claims that can discourage whistle blowers from making use of leniency 
programmes.
139
 The Commission wants to takes action in order to avoid this 
consequence. Therefore, The Commission has explicitly stated on two 
occasions in the White Paper that claimants should not have a right to access 
(at any point in time) the so-called ‘corporate statements’ made by all 
(successful and unsuccessful) leniency applicants.
140
 This would limit the 
threat of exposure of all leniency applicants and thereby the Commission 
hopes to keep the leniency programmes attractive. 
  
It can be deduced from this that the Commission values the leniency 
programme above all, but there is also a more pragmatic reason behind this 
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exclusion of corporate statements. Namely, if companies had not blown the 
whistle, meaning that they had not made this corporate statement in the first 
place, then this document had not existed and no one would have had access 
to it. Therefore, in such a situation, it cannot be unfair to deny claimants in 
civil proceedings the right to obtain the corporate statement; whereas the 
protection against disclosure of these documents may make leniency 
programmes more attractive, thus facilitating public enforcement for the 
purpose of deterrence and punishment.  
 
In essence, the Commission has argued that discovery of corporate 
statements and related Commission materials would undermine the leniency 
programmes and thereby also the effective enforcement of EU competition 
law. This is because companies would be deterred from submitting leniency 
applications if they run the risk that the self-incriminating information they 
supply in order to obtain immunity would be handed over to private 
plaintiffs suing them for damages.
141
 Therefore, the Commission is 
understandably advocating a strong protection of corporate statements made 
by leniency applicants. Moreover, this is a perfect example of a situation 
where the public and private interests have been weighed against each other 
with the result of public interest prevailing at the end. 
 
4.2.3 Reducing Civil Liability 
The Commission also considers rewarding successful applicants by limiting 
their civil liability to claims by their direct and indirect contractual partners. 
The Commission finds that this would help to make the scope of damages to 
be paid by immunity recipients more predictable and more limited, without 
unduly sheltering them from civil liability for their participation in an 
infringement.
142
 However, the commentators do not support the approach 
the Commission has chosen according to which leniency programmes 
prevail over the principle of full compensation for victims.  
 
First, Komninos finds that this question of reducing the civil liability of 
successful leniency applicants goes to the core of the relationship between 
public and private enforcement. Furthermore, the objectives and functions 
of private antitrust damages actions have a decisive role to play in 
determining whether liability should be reduced or not. He explains that, if 
the paramount objective-function is compensation, then limiting liability 
will be difficult; if, however, deterrence is also an objective-function, it will 
be easier to protect the integrity and attractiveness of the leniency 
programme by limiting civil liability.
143
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Second, Bulst contends that the Commission in the White Paper attempts to 
strike a balance between the desire not to disadvantage leniency applicants 
vis-à-vis other infringers and the aim of not unduly protecting the leniency 
applicant from the civil law consequences.
144
 However, Hodges maintains 
that it is practically impossible to reconcile the fundamentally different 
approaches of a ‘leniency programme’ and a private litigation model.145 
First of all, because a leniency programme policy is a sensible tool of a 
regulator, and virtually incapable of being integrated into a privatized and 
court adjudicated enforcement system. Secondly, private litigation model 
would lead to independent decisions being taken by countless judges and 
authorities across the Member States, and the prospect of achieving 
consistency in such complex subject matter would be unattainable.
146
 
 
Third, this proposal would lead to a somewhat questionable result. Namely, 
that the only persons entitled to receive compensation from the immunity 
recipient are those who directly bought the cartelised products or services 
from the immunity recipient (i.e. direct contractual partners), or those 
further down the supply chain who bought these products or services 
(directly or through intermediaries) from the direct contractual partners (i.e. 
indirect contractual partners).
147
 Komninos is not satisfied with the proposal 
the Commission made in the White Paper and contends that the problem is 
the proposal to bar totally certain classes of individuals from claiming 
damages against an undertaking that has infringed Article 101 TFEU.
148
 It 
would mean that a victim that fails to qualify for either of the categories 
mentioned and, more importantly, a harmed competitor will not be able to 
claim damages from the successful leniency applicant.
149
 
 
Fourth, Komninos strongly advocates the idea that public enforcement by 
the Commission and its intention to facilitate detection through immunity of 
fines should not function to the detriment of private enforcement and the 
compensation of cartel victims.
150
 This approach was accepted in the 
Leniency Notice as well. Therefore, the option chosen by the Commission 
in the White Paper to limit the civil liability in this manner seems all the 
more uncertain as to its legitimacy. Komninos also questions whether the 
limitation of the right of competitors and others not falling under the 
Commission’s definition of ‘direct and indirect contractual partners’ is 
compatible with primary EU law, i.e. with the Treaty itself and the Court’s 
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rulings in Courage and Manfredi, which stress that the right to damages 
should be open to ‘any individual’.151 Wils generally supports this view and 
concludes that granting leniency recipients immunity from damages or any 
reduction of their liability in follow-on actions for damages would appear 
unnecessary and unjust.
152
 
 
Finally, these arguments supporting damages actions over leniency have not 
convinced everyone though. Some authors have even gone as far as 
advocating a complete immunity from damages claims of successful 
leniency applicants. Riley argues that there is no loss to any plaintiff from 
immunity for the defendant leniency applicant. He explained that not only is 
immunity valuable as a matter of Union public policy, as without immunity 
applicants anti-cartel detection and enforcement is substantially undermined, 
but as a matter of logic without leniency applicants there can be no damages 
claims.
153
 He found that these two arguments together provide a powerful 
argument for the Court of Justice to provide an exception to the right to real 
and effective judicial protection in EU law. However, Riley’s view has not 
received support and it is in no way in coherence with the Court’s consistent 
case law, which gives the right to damages to ‘any individual’. 
 
4.3 Access to Evidence 
The reason behind introducing the access to evidence clause in the White 
Paper is that the Commission wants to overcome the structural information 
asymmetry between the parties of the civil claim.
154
 It is clear that private 
claimants who are acting collectively or on their own do not have the same 
access to evidence as public authorities. Therefore, in order to assist the 
private claimants to prove the factual basis necessary for a claim under 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU, the Commission in the White Paper suggested a 
minimum harmonization of procedural laws. 
 
As mentioned above, one of the aims of the White Paper set out by the 
Commission is to ease the possibility of bringing follow-on actions for 
damages. One of the mechanisms for achieving this goal would be to allow 
the claimants to have right to disclosure inter partes for EU antitrust 
damages cases. Even if claimants do not need to prove the existence of the 
competition law infringement anymore (due to the binding effect of the 
NCA and the Commission’s decision), they still need information, which 
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would help to prove the extent of the harm caused by the infringer and for 
proving the causal link between the violation and the harm. 
 
However, the first obstacle in creating such a mechanism of disclosure is 
that most Member States follow a civil law tradition, which presumes that in 
civil cases it is the task of the plaintiff to present all the evidence before the 
court. Nevertheless, three Member States follow the common law 
tradition,
155
 in which notice pleading prevails: where the essential legal 
issues are raised in the originating process but where the plaintiff expects to 
be able to obtain further evidence through discovery procedures.
156
 Thus, 
introducing a system where disclosure inter partes is allowed, is not totally 
new to all Member States. 
 
The Commission’s proposals on access to evidence in the White Paper, may 
not always be easy to integrate into some Member States’ rules of 
procedure, however they do not seem to depart fundamentally from the 
continental tradition of fact pleading, i.e. the requirement that detailed facts 
are asserted and clearly specified means of evidence are proffered during the 
pleading phase of the proceedings and evidence taking by and before the 
judge.
157
 
 
4.3.1 Limited Access Only 
As stated above, the Commission in the White Paper suggested that across 
the EU a minimum level of disclosure inter partes for antitrust damages 
cases should be ensured. However, access to evidence should be based on 
fact-pleading and strict judicial control of the plausibility of the claim and 
the proportionality of the disclosure request.
158
 
 
The disclosure mechanism that the Commission opted for sets out very strict 
conditions that need to be fulfilled before national courts can order 
defendants or third parties to disclose specific categories of relevant 
evidence. These conditions include tests of relevance and proportionality; 
the demand that the claimant present all the facts that show plausible 
grounds for his action and that he has exhausted the means of evidence 
reasonably available to him.
159
 Thus, the Member States’ courts will not 
have to permit the kind of ‘fishing expeditions’ the American regime of pre-
trial discovery allows.
160
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However, not all commentators are satisfied with the way the Commission’s 
proposal is drafted and ask for even stricter rules in order to avoid the 
dangers of abuse of the disclosure instrument and the necessity to protect 
confidential business information.
161
 Anything coming close to enabling 
private claimants to blackmail an undertaking into payments simply to avoid 
a lengthy disclosure procedure has to be avoided.
162
  
 
4.3.2 Shortcut through Transparency 
Regulation 
The Commission’s suggestion to allow limited inter partes disclosure in 
damages claims becomes understandable, when looking at the measures 
infringement victims have resorted to when looking for access to the public 
enforcer’s file. Therefore, if defendants or third-parties had the obligation to 
disclose some documents, then the pressure would shift from the public 
enforcer to private parties instead. 
 
Private claimants have been aware of the fact that in the public enforcer’s 
file a lot of important information already exists, which would be helpful 
when bringing a follow-on claim to a civil court and therefore have sought 
access to these files through alternative means. In order to understand 
whether the access to evidence even needs to be regulated in a future 
directive, it is important to establish whether the access exists already and 
thereby additional regulating is made redundant.  
 
The way to get access to the Commission files has been tried by resorting to 
the Regulation regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents
163
 (hereinafter ‘Transparency Regulation’). Under 
this Regulation, any person has the right to access documents held by any of 
the institutions, subject to limited and restrictively construed exceptions. 
Also, when a person makes an application for access under this Regulation 
he does not need to provide a reason for their requests. This would not be a 
possibility under the solution, which was suggested by the Commission in 
the White Paper.  
 
Recital 11 to the Transparency Regulation states that the principle 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, according to which all documents of 
the institutions should be accessible to the public. It continues by declaring 
that certain public and private interests should be protected by way of 
exceptions. Several of these exceptions are enumerated in Article 4 of the 
Transparency Regulation, including the protection of the purpose of 
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inspections, investigations, commercial interests of a natural or legal person, 
and the protection of internal documents where disclosure would undermine 
the institution’s decision-making process. These exceptions can be 
overruled only where there exists an overriding public interest in disclosure. 
The mandatory injunction to refuse disclosure of these types of documents 
unless an overriding public interest prevails, presents a challenge because it 
does not give the Commission a wide discretion to disclose.
164
 
 
The General Court in Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau confirmed the fact that 
the Transparency Regulation is applicable in competition law 
proceedings.
165
 Thus, as documents gathered in the course of investigations 
of violations of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are not automatically exempt 
from the scope of the Transparency Regulation, plaintiffs in follow-on 
actions attempt to gain access to documents in the Commission files in the 
hope that those may aid them in carrying the burden of proof.
166
 
 
What can be said about the Transparency Regulation is that it is a rather 
accidental instance of regulation of the interface between public and private 
enforcement in the sense that its use (or attempted use) in private 
enforcement (especially in follow-on actions) could hardly be subsumed 
under the legislative intent behind it, which centres on the concept of 
governance openness.
167
 Therefore, there is the risk that not all concerns, 
which derive from the need to protect leniency applicants, have been taken 
into consideration in this Regulation, thus making this not the optimal 
regulator in competition law cases. 
 
4.3.3 Solution in Pfleiderer Case? 
If in the previous chapter the access to Commission’s file was sought, then 
in this chapter, it will be shown, how civil litigants have tried to get access 
to a NCA’s file, which involved leniency applications. The recent 
Pfleiderer
168
 case, in which the Court gave its judgment just last year, is a 
good example. 
 
In Pfleiderer, the question was whether the parties, wanting to bring a civil-
law claim, may be given access to information and documents voluntarily 
submitted in connection with leniency applications, which the national 
competition authority of a Member State had received.  
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In its ruling, the Court emphasised both the importance of damages actions 
for maintaining effective competition in the Union and the importance of 
effective leniency programmes, which would help to uncover and bring to 
an end infringements of competition rules.
169
 At the end though, the Court 
decided to leave it up to the national courts to do the weighing exercise. 
Hence, it is up to the national courts on a case-by-case basis to weigh the 
respective interests in favour of disclosure of the information and in favour 
of the protection of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant 
for leniency.
170
 
 
This judgment received many comments, both positive and negative. It was 
even stated that this decision risks suffocating both future public and private 
enforcement. Since Pfleiderer, the question arises whether the leniency 
applicant may be ordered to disclose leniency documents, at least under the 
conditions set out in that judgement, whereas before, it could be argued that 
due to the duty of loyal cooperation, national courts were not entitled to 
order the leniency applicant to disclose leniency information.
171
 Komninos 
finds that the ruling has offered support to the Commission and the NCAs in 
their approach to resist or limit access to such evidence by civil claimants, 
when the effectiveness of their leniency programmes is at stake.
172
 
 
The Amtsgericht (District Court) Bonn, who had made the reference for a 
preliminary ruling to the Court, decided the case in the beginning of this 
year and rejected the application made by Pfleiderer AG to order the 
Bundeskartellamt (German Cartel Office) to disclose the documents 
submitted to it by leniency applicants.
173
 Thus, it is clear how high the 
German antitrust system values its leniency programme and it could also be 
seen as an indicator of how other national courts will decide.  
 
In the context of private actions for damages, this judgment means that the 
divergences in different Member States regarding access to documents 
might grow even further apart, as the decision can now be made on a case-
by-case basis. In order to avoid increased pressure on public enforcers 
throughout the Union to allow access to their files, disclosure inter partes 
needs to be introduced. 
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4.4 Fines and Damages 
4.4.1 Fines 
Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may, by 
decision, impose fines on undertakings or associations of undertakings 
where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 101 or 102 of 
the Treaty. In exercising its power to impose such fines, the Commission 
enjoys a wide margin of discretion within the limits set by Regulation 
1/2003, meaning that the Commission must have regard both to the gravity 
and to the duration of the infringement. In addition, the fine imposed may 
not exceed certain limits set out in the Regulation 1/2003.
174
 
 
The fines, which may be imposed by the Commission (or the national 
competition authorities) for infringements of the antitrust rules, are both a 
punishment and part of a general policy designed to control the conduct of 
undertakings. The intention is that the fine imposed should have a 
sufficiently deterrent or preventive effect.
175
 Furthermore, the fines should 
not only deter the undertakings concerned from engaging in future 
infringements (special deterrence) but deter potential future offenders more 
generally (general deterrence).
176
 The Court as well has stressed the 
importance of fines in the process of ensuring the effective enforcement of 
the competition law provisions.
177
  
 
It is important that the fine is set correctly, meaning that it outweighs the 
illegal profits gained from the cartel membership. Wils argues that the 
calculation of the optimal amount of the fine is always difficult in practice, 
but with public enforcement, it is possible to attempt to target the optimal 
amount.
178
 In addition, the public enforcer’s discretion is necessary in order 
to be able to set a sufficiently high level of fines. However, this discretion 
encompasses a great lack of transparency and certainty in the fining system 
of the public enforcer.
179
 Furthermore, there is no guarantee that even with 
higher fines the effective level of deterrence can be reached,
180
 which should 
after all be the most important aim of imposing fines. 
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4.4.2 Damages 
The Court in Manfredi
181
 set out the rules for damages, according to which 
victims of an EU competition law infringement are entitled to full 
compensation of the harm caused, namely of ‘actual loss’ (damnum 
emergens) and of loss of profit (lucrum cessans), plus interest from the time 
the damage occurred until the capital sum awarded is actually paid. 
 
For reasons of legal certainty and to raise awareness amongst potential 
infringers and victims, the Commission in the White Paper suggested 
codifying the current acquis communautaire on the scope of damages that 
victims of antitrust infringements can recover.
182
 
 
However, leaving aside the straightforward issue of the type of damages, the 
matter of calculation of damages in antitrust cases can be and usually also is 
a very complex matter. In practice, it is often impossible to quantify the 
damage suffered in an exact manner, as there are just too many unknown 
variables, beginning with the hypothetical market price if the violation had 
not taken place.
183
 Therefore, it is generally accepted that courts may and 
must work with estimates, which is not an unusual practice in other cases 
either.
184
 
 
The Commission acknowledged the existence of the problems that national 
courts face when estimating the amount of damages in the Staff Working 
Paper.
185
 As a result, the Commission has now issued a Draft Guidance 
Paper − Quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty.
186
 The aim of this Guidance Paper is to 
offer assistance to courts and parties involved in actions for damages by 
making more widely available information relevant for quantifying harm 
caused by infringements of the EU antitrust rules.
187
 However, as this 
Guidance Paper is purely informative, it does not bind national courts and 
does not alter the legal rules applicable in the Member States to damages 
actions based on infringements of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.
188
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4.4.3 Accumulation of Liability 
As was concluded in the third chapter of this thesis, it is not possible to 
substitute public enforcement with private or vice versa. As a result, public 
law liability and civil law liability necessarily exist alongside each other.
189
 
 
AG Mazák is correct in his statement whereby so far neither legislation nor 
case law has established any de jure hierarchy or order of priority between 
public enforcement of EU competition law and private actions for 
damages.
190
 Therefore, as there is no specific legislation on this matter, the 
accumulation of liability in public and private enforcement proceedings 
remains largely uncoordinated.
191
 Furthermore, the diverging national laws 
in this respect may promote instances of multiple liability.
192
 Various EU 
institutions, national courts and commentators have already expressed their 
concerns regarding this situation. 
 
Now, a heated debate has arisen about whether the current approach of the 
Commission complies with the rule of law in Europe.
193
 In particular, the 
Intel proceedings where the Commission imposed a record-high fine of over 
one billion Euros were a clear sign of the distinct tendency towards 
increasingly higher fines in this field. This has led some commentators 
questioning whether private enforcement could put undertakings under even 
more pressure.
194
 Also, considering that administrative fines have a cap of 
10% of the company’s annual turnover, why is there no such restriction in 
the field of ‘private fines’? All these concerns put even more pressure on the 
Commission to work out a ‘harmonized system’ relating to private damages 
claims and administrative fines. Otherwise, if no action is taken in this 
regard, the uncoordinated accumulation of liability in public and private 
enforcement proceedings could exceed the amount necessary to achieve 
enforceability and thereby lead to inefficient over-deterrence.
195
  
 
The principle of ne bis in idem could be of significance and help at this 
point. This principle means that a person cannot be ‘sanctioned more than 
once for the same unlawful conduct to protect one and the same interest’. It 
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is a general principle of EU law, which follows from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and has been codified in Article 50 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
196
.
197
 
 
However, as already discussed earlier under ‘Leniency’, this principle does 
not protect a whistle-blower against other competition authorities or private 
damages claims after being granted immunity or being fined by the 
Commission.
198
 In addition, an administrative fine imposed by the 
Commission or by a national competition authority on an undertaking has 
no significance in a civil trial centred on the same facts and undertakings. 
This means that the ne bis in idem principle does not apply as between 
administrative and private enforcement. At the same time, private damages 
awards that precede administrative (public) proceedings should in principle 
have no bearing on the possible fines.
199
  
 
From this it can be concluded that the ne bis in idem principle has not 
proven to be helpful for solving the problem of accumulation of liability, as 
it does not prevent simultaneous application of fines and damages in 
competition law infringements. This means that other solutions must be 
developed for this problem. Coordination on a general level is urgently 
needed, as otherwise, there will be an ad hoc approach taken in every case, 
which does not solve the problem at the core. 
 
4.4.4 Multiple Damages – Yes or No? 
Punitive or multiple damages are damages that are awarded to a claimant in 
a civil lawsuit on the basis of illegitimate conduct of the opposing party. 
Their goal is punitive and deterrent as opposed to compensatory, and their 
amount is therefore not dependent on the damages actually suffered, 
although in some legal systems, a ratio between compensation and punitive 
damages may exist.
200
 
 
For the victims of anti-competitive conduct the instrument of multiple 
damages certainly provides a strong incentive to take legal action against the 
party causing the damage. The authors advocating the possibility of multiple 
damages find that under the aspect of deterrence it seems to be reasonable to 
balance a low probability of discovering anticompetitive conduct by the risk 
of higher damages.
201
 However, if double damages are not necessary in all 
                                               
196 OJ C 83/02, 30.03.2010. 
197 M.J. Frese, ‘Fines and Damages under EU Competition Law: Implications of the 
Accumulation of Liability’, 34(3) World Competition (2011), p. 424. 
198 P. Billiet, ‘How lenient is the EC leniency policy? A matter of certainty and 
predictability’, 30(1) ECLR (2009), p. 20. 
199 A.P. Komninos, ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? 
Overlap?’ 3(1) CompLRev. (2006), p. 23. 
200 M. Hazelhorst, ‘Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: Why Punitive Damages 
Are a Step Too Far’, 19(4) ERPL (2010), p. 764. 
201 U. Böge and K. Ost, ‘Up and running, or is it? Private enforcement – the situation in 
Germany and policy perspectives’, 27(4) ECLR (2006), p. 201. 
 41 
competition law infringement cases, then in cases of hard-core cartels they 
are found to be a sensible solution, as it is important that cartel victims shall 
not be under-compensated and offenders not be under-deterred. 
Commentators find that in hard-core cartel cases, a double damages rule is 
more likely to award full compensation of the overall losses suffered than a 
simple damages rule.
202
 Therefore, even if it occasionally leads to over-
compensatory awards, then this is still easier to tolerate than the regular 
under-compensation, which results from the existent single damages rule. 
 
However, the ones arguing against multiple damages definitely have more 
‘heavyweight’ arguments on their side. First, the introduction of punitive 
damages would raise constitutional concerns in many Member States. For 
example, the German Federal Supreme Court has rejected a proposal to 
declare enforceable a US court decision, whereby punitive damages were 
awarded, which exceeded the damage suffered by the plaintiff. According to 
the Federal Supreme Court, punitive damages were incompatible with the 
state’s monopoly on punishment and the corresponding procedural 
safeguards, and with the ban on enrichment under the law of damages.
203
 
This kind of punitive damages thus violated the substantive ordre public in 
Germany.  
 
Secondly, multiple damages would also be in contradiction with the 
understanding of the law of damages according to which this law has a 
compensatory function.
204
 From an antitrust enforcement viewpoint, the 
potential for overcompensation acts as an incentive for claimants and 
provides an additional deterrent against potential infringers of antitrust laws, 
which is welcomed by enforcement agencies like the Commission. 
However, in most European jurisdictions, the notion of offering 
overcompensation is regarded as contrary to principle.
205
 Therefore, in most 
of the Member States according to the existent rules, the applicant is only 
entitled to receive compensation in the amount of damage actually suffered. 
As an exception to the rule in the EU, only the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Cyprus allow for the award of punitive damages.
206
 
 
However, not even in the United Kingdom the issue of punitive damages in 
competition law cases is very clear. Therefore, as a third matter, the ne bis 
in idem principle comes into play. The possibility of awarding multiple 
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damages gives rise to serious questions concerning this principle.
207
 The 
judgment of the High Court in Devenish etc. v. Vitamin cartelists
208
 
deserves attention in this regard. There the English High Court held that the 
principle of ne bis in idem precludes the award of exemplary or punitive 
damages  in an action for damages following a fining decision by the 
European Commission, even if the fine has been commuted to zero as a 
result of the application of the European Commission’s Leniency Notice.209  
This judgment is another example showing how reluctant national courts are 
of rewarding multiple damages to victims of a competition law 
infringement, at least in follow-on actions.
210
 Therefore, it is still open 
whether the English courts would find differently in a stand-alone case, as 
there would be no prior punishment. However, in those cases the issue of ne 
bis in idem would be present if the public enforcer then afterwards decides 
to fine the infringer. Then the latter would have been punished twice for the 
same infringement, which would go against that principle. 
 
As a result of the potential overcompensation, a fourth issue arises in the 
context of multiple damages claims, namely the risk of unjust enrichment of 
the applicant. The Court in its case law has emphasised that Union law does 
not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of 
the rights guaranteed by Union law does not entail the unjust enrichment of 
those who enjoy them.
211
 This means that national courts do not have to 
award multiple damages to the applicant, but only damages in the amount, 
which the latter can prove. The reason behind this statement is that a 
contrary finding would provide a strong incentive for claimants to sue 
thereby increasing the litigation culture that is not common to the European 
culture and traditions.
212
 Martin illustrates this danger of the US culture 
invading the EU by asking ‘whether the cowboy has already ridden into 
town or whether there exists a fence tall enough to keep him out’.213 
Meaning that introducing such as strong incentive for going to court would 
bring Europe closer to the United States system that is necessary or even 
wanted by probably the vast majority of the Member States. 
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Furthermore, if multiple damages awards were introduced in this context, 
the focus of damages claims would shift fundamentally from the protection 
of private interests for compensation to the pursuit of the public interest in 
enhanced deterrence.
214
 Additionally, it would unnecessarily blur the 
functions of private and public enforcement. The Commission has 
emphasised the importance of damages claims in increased deterrence by 
raising the stakes of the game, however, if this were the ultimate aim, then it 
would be not make sense to express concerns about the risk of unjust 
enrichment.
215
 
 
Finally, the Commissioner for Competition Joaquín Almunia expressed the 
Commission’s view by stating that: 
 
‘… the initiative must ensure that victims obtain full compensation of the actual loss 
incurred. But not more than full compensation. This is not about punishment, it is 
about justice.’216 
 
Considering the contra-arguments presented above, the introduction of 
multiple damages for violations of national or European competition law 
does not appear to be desirable. Moreover, when comparing general tort law 
with antitrust law, the latter does not show any exceptional features, which 
would justify such a massive intervention into the existing structures.
217
 
Information asymmetries or difficulties in presenting evidence also exist in 
other sectors such as the law on medical malpractice or product liability 
where a system of multiple damages has not been introduced either.
218
 
 
Therefore, it only makes sense that the Commission in the White Paper no 
longer mentioned double damages, presumably after the proposal in the 
Green Paper was severely criticized by the Member States.
219
 However, the 
Commission in the Staff Working Paper explicitly leaves room for 
adaptation of the European definition of damages in the future.
220
 This 
means that the Commission has not totally given up on the idea of someday 
introducing multiple damages in the context of antitrust infringement 
proceedings, if it considers it necessary. 
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4.5 No Need for Harmonisation? 
Having regard to the difficulties arising in the relationship between public 
and private enforcement after the planned harmonisation, the question 
inevitably raises whether the harmonisation is necessary in the first place. 
Even if one would admit that private enforcement does have an important 
complementary role in the antitrust enforcement system, it does not 
necessary mean that the measures for strengthening it should come from the 
Union legislator. 
 
Therefore, it is understandable that the voices opposing a revolutionary 
development that the Commission is striving for with a directive grow 
stronger. It could also be said that instead of ground breaking actions taken 
by the Commission, the development of private damages actions should be 
evolutionary instead. Therefore, the Commission’s task in this should be to 
give guidelines and wait for a natural course of events. This is especially 
true in the ‘new’ Member States where private enforcement actions are 
almost non-existent and where this is due to the underdevelopment of public 
enforcement, as follow-on claims are the ones that make up the majority of 
damages claims actions. Thus, instead of pushing forward the directive, the 
Commission should help on those Member States which clearly suffer from 
a suboptimal level of enforcement of competition law in general, not just on 
the private side.  
 
One could therefore say that the Commission should not be pushing for the 
one-off solution that would facilitate private enforcement claims in all 
Member States. As there are 27 different national systems, they will be 
differently influenced by the harmonisation and the change cannot be 
presumed to always be positive or even necessary. It can already be seen 
that those Member States, which have a long and established history of 
public enforcement (e.g. the UK, Germany…), have understood the need for 
public enforcement actions and have taken the necessary steps to facilitate 
them in a manner which suits their own national system best.  
 
Also, considering that a joint effort by the Commission and the Member 
States to increase awareness of the possibilities of bringing antitrust 
damages suits may be enough for the victims of anticompetitive conduct to 
find the ways of obtaining full compensation.
221
 Hence, raising awareness of 
victims through discussions on this topic should already increase the 
number of claims brought and thereby also the number of victims obtaining 
compensation. If the latter is the real aim and the problem that the 
Commission wants to tackle with its potential future directive on the 
damages, then there is no actual need to start demolishing carefully balanced 
national tort law systems that do not enjoy the support of the Member States 
themselves. Even more so, as there are strong grounds to suspect that 
adverse consequences may well follow, and that reforms may unbalance 
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legal and societal values and the economy, rather than improve them.
222
 
Furthermore, amendments in relation to competition law would inevitably 
have consequences in all other sectors: competition law cannot be 
approached within civil justice systems in a vacuum.
223
 Interfering with the 
balancing factors runs the risk of destabilizing not only the system of 
justice, but also of society, and of introducing a litigation culture.
224
 The 
severity of the consequences, which may follow therefore need to be taken 
into consideration before issuing any legislation on this matter. 
 
Moreover, considering that the continuously growing amount of fines 
indicate that public sanctions are reaching a high level of deterrence, one 
may wonder whether this is the right time for an initiative to top up the bill 
presented to competition law offenders with additional private sanctions.
225
 
However: first, there is reason to believe that despite the Commission’s 
recent successes in detecting violations of competition law, still only the tip 
of the iceberg is visible; second, there is hope that if provided with 
sufficient incentives, private parties will help to uncover (and as a 
consequence, deter) more anti-competitive practices than the Commission 
and its national counterparts would ever be able to find and deal with on 
their own.
226
 It can be concluded that these concerns and suggestions 
expressed earlier have been and will be ignored by the Commission who 
sees an enhanced antitrust enforcement as the greater good. 
 
Furthermore, Eilmansberger claims that the objective of removing civil law 
obstacles to damages claims cannot be attained by soft law.
227
 He finds that 
it would be naive to expect national legislators or judges to make significant 
changes to the relevant civil law provisions with a view to facilitating cartel 
damages actions in reaction to mere guidelines or recommendations issued 
by the Commission.
228
 Soft law measures would not require the Member 
States to take action,
229
 which means that the situation where different 
procedures and remedies are be available, would continue to exist. This on 
its turn would constitute an unjustified disadvantage for some individuals 
and companies. In addition, in certain cases it would encourage forum 
shopping in order to find the most favourable regulation. Nevertheless, it is 
still not clear what form this legislation will take, although Komninos 
proposes that a Community ‘hard law’ instrument, such as a directive, is 
most likely.
230
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Finally, the argument that the ‘new’ Member States are in need of a more 
effective public enforcement than introducing new action for damages rules, 
does not hold up either. Even if that is the situation and public enforcement 
lags behind, it does not mean that measures making private enforcement 
more operable cannot be taken in the meanwhile. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
5.1 Where Does Private Antitrust 
Enforcement Stand Now? 
The reason why the position and functions of private enforcement needed to 
be analysed in the third chapter was that without the answers to those 
questions, it would not be possible to find the areas in which the 
harmonisation of private damages actions has the most influence on the 
existing enforcement system, where the public enforcement enjoys a 
monopoly. From the discussions and arguments in that chapter, the 
conclusion regarding the compensatory and complementary nature of 
private actions for damages was the most important. This means that 
damages actions and public enforcement should be perceived as 
smoothening out each other’s shortcomings in many aspects. After finding 
that private enforcement is indeed vital for achieving an optimal 
enforcement system, the next step was to see, how far in the proposals made 
by the Commission in the White Paper the functions of private enforcement 
have been taken into account. Four key areas were analysed for this. 
 
First, the idea of binding effect of NCA decisions is very welcomed in many 
aspects. For the applicants, this new setup would mean that they do not have 
to prove the infringement of competition law again. Gathering evidence 
regarding the breach would be burdensome for the applicants, as they have 
very limited investigatory means available to them, considering that 
generally there is no right to access the competition authority’s file. From 
the perspective of the national court, the binding effect would ease their 
burden in actions for damages as well, because the civil court does not have 
to evaluate sometimes extremely complicated competition law 
infringements. Being ‘mere assessors of damages’231 would probably be 
welcomed by most non-specialised civil court judges.  
 
This binding effect would also contribute a great deal towards legal 
certainty in this area, as this makes impossible a scenario in which an 
administrative court or an NCA has found there to be an infringement of 
competition law and at the same instance a civil court has not. For the 
infringer and defendant in the civil case, this would mean that it is not 
possible to rebut the existence of the infringement once the decision of the 
competition authority has become final. However, there is no reason why 
the infringer should get a second chance for proving his innocence. 
Therefore, the binding effect of NCA decisions should definitely be 
included in a directive regarding damages actions, as it shows that the 
Commission is committed to facilitating private damages actions and 
removing some of the obstacles. Thus, easing the burden of proof for 
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victims enhances the attractiveness of private damages actions, which 
provides an increased ability for these claims to fulfil their compensatory 
function. 
 
As stated already earlier, leniency programmes will be the ones suffering 
most due to the reforms in private damages actions. The greater possibility 
of bringing follow-on actions for damages acts as a disincentive for 
potential leniency applicants, which would have serious consequences for 
the Commission and the NCA, who are increasingly relying on leniency. 
Therefore, it is understandable that the Commission is willing to interfere 
with the full compensation principle set out as the aim of the White Paper, 
in order to spare the attractiveness of leniency programmes. While trying to 
do this, the Commission has, however, forgot to take into account the 
Court’s case law on damages actions. Namely, that the Court has worded a 
principle whereby ‘any individual’ has the right to claim damages. This 
principle is in stark contrast with the Commission’s proposal to limit the 
civil liability of successful leniency applicants, by only allowing the latters’ 
direct and indirect contractual partners to claim damages. This is a good 
example of how the Commission is willing to sacrifice the full 
compensation principle and thereby endanger the private enforcement as a 
whole, to what it defines as the public interest in greater antitrust 
enforcement.  
 
The third matter assessed was the right to access evidence. The White Paper 
proposal includes disclosure inter partes, which will be subject to strict 
judicial control. This has the aim of facilitating damages claims by adding a 
possibility for the applicant to gather evidence for proving the amount of 
damages and the causal link between the breach and the harm inflicted.
232
 
The approach of the Commission may be welcomed for that it tries to set up 
a mechanism in order to avoid abusive litigation, which would only be 
brought to get access to a competitor’s business secrets.  
 
However, another motive of the Commission could be seen behind this new 
procedural rule. Namely, that the Commission is eager to diminish the 
interest of private parties to request access to the public enforcers’ files in 
order to get evidence for a potential civil action. Private parties have tried to 
get access to the Commission’s own files through the Transparency 
Regulation and in the Member States using national rules, which has not 
received overly positive reactions from the public enforcers. In their eyes 
cases involving leniency applications are the ones needing most protection. 
However, as the public enforcement is increasingly relying on its leniency 
programme to find infringers, there is a high likelihood that the files 
wanting to be accessed by victims involve leniency applicants. Hence, it 
would be detrimental for these programmes, if the right to access would be 
granted by a national court. This is possible scenario, as there is no 
regulation and no legal certainty at the moment, because cases are decided 
on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, creating the possibility of disclosure 
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inter partes would be helpful for redirecting the attention from the public 
enforcement files. 
 
The fourth issue covered was the relationship between fines and damages. 
The White Paper only provides for the codification of the acquis 
communautaire, thus it does not really change anything for the private 
claimants. The White Paper does not regulate the consequences of 
accumulation of liability, which is the consequence of simultaneous 
application of fines by the public enforcer and damages rewarded to private 
parties for the same infringement. By facilitating private damages actions, 
the likelihood of damages actually being awarded grows significantly. As 
concluded from the analysis above, the principle of ne bis in idem does not 
apply between administrative proceedings and private enforcement. 
Therefore, there is no coordination between the consequences of the two 
‘limbs’ of enforcement, which may seriously affect the infringers’ economic 
situation and in the worst case scenario lead them to bankruptcy. The fact 
that the Commission has not considered these potentially very serious 
consequences for the infringers shows that it has strong belief in the 
deterrent effect of penalties plus damages.  
 
The White Paper does not include the Commission’s initial idea of 
introducing double damages. Not pursuing this idea demonstrates just how 
determined the Commission is to getting the approval of the Member States 
in order then to be able to issue the directive. Even though double damages 
would work as an incentive for potential claimants to bring an action and as 
a strong deterrent for infringers, the Commission sacrificed this idea. It 
should be clear, that the exclusion of certain controversial instruments from 
the White Paper may increase the chances of reaching political agreement 
on other measures the Commission recommends.
233
 
 
All in all, the impression one gets from the proposals made in the White 
Paper, is that the Commission does try to take measures to facilitate private 
damages actions, but at the same time making sure that nothing threatens its 
Leniency Programmes. Therefore, as to the relationship between public and 
private enforcement after the harmonisation, the commentators hoping for a 
delicately balanced system,
234
 should be disappointed. At least at the 
moment it seems that the Commission does not depart from the idea of 
superiority of public enforcement in the European Union competition law 
enforcement. In addition, the Commission still looks at private damages 
actions mostly as adding to the deterrent effect, thus not prioritising their 
compensatory nature. Once this is understood, it is possible to comprehend 
the choices the Commission has made in scenarios where private and public 
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enforcement overlap. Nevertheless, even if the Commission’s choices are 
comprehendible (in order to secure its position and the dominance of public 
enforcement), it does not mean that they are right. There is no plausible 
reason (besides the historic tradition) why public enforcement needs to be 
prioritised in every situation. The legislative action taken now presents a 
good opportunity to break this pattern. Otherwise, it will always be the 
private enforcement, which has to give way to the needs of public 
enforcement. This means that even after the harmonisation has been 
concluded, private enforcement still has to settle with the role of a ‘side-
kick’ of public enforcement in the overall enforcement system.  
 
However, from the perspective of potential private claimants, any measure 
taken for eliminating obstacles is welcomed, regardless of the potential 
ulterior motives of the legislator. After all, for the victims of competition 
law infringements all that matters is the possibility of recovering the harm 
suffered from the infringers. The rest is just a matter of policy. 
 
5.2 How to Go Forward? 
However, the Commission will find some of the battles in the quest for a 
harmonised system of private damages actions very difficult. It will not just 
be the question of why special procedural rules for competition law are 
needed, but the broader sovereignty question for the Member States who see 
national procedural law substantially off limits to Union law activity save 
where there is a compelling cross-border argument.
235
 In addition, not all the 
proposals in the White Paper taken separately received positive feedback 
from the commentators, especially those where the needs of public and 
private enforcement had to weighed against each other. Hence, it will be 
interesting to see whether the draft Directive can be adopted in its current 
form and despite the resistance of some Member States and the European 
Parliament.
236
 
 
Regardless of these concerns raised, the Commission has scheduled this 
legislative initiative into its Work Programme for 2012. There the objective 
is defined as ensuring effective damages actions before national courts for 
breaches of EU antitrust rules and clarifying the interrelation of such private 
actions with public enforcement by the Commission and the national 
competition authorities, in order to preserve the central role of public 
enforcement in the EU.
237
 It is indeed intriguing to see just how successful 
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this attempt will be and if the Commission does manage to get all the 
Member States aboard this initiative. 
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